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Abstract
This essay maintains that originalism—the idea that the Constitution should be
interpreted according to its original meaning--is nearing its demise. Ironically, the beginning of
the end of originalism may have been prompted by the Supreme Court’s decision in District of
Columbia v. Heller, marking the first time that a majority of the Court signed onto an opinion
emphatically taking an originalist slant. Heller may represent the apogee of originalism and,
because it exposes the fundamental flaws of originalism, may also mark the beginning of its
decline.
Originalism is a radical departure from the Supreme Court’s well-established
jurisprudence of a living Constitution. From its very inception, constitutional law has been a
dynamic process of creativity and the vast majority of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
Constitution have been non-originalist in their methodology. Originalism cannot explain the
large body of constitutional doctrine that has developed over the years since the Constitution
was adopted.
Serious flaws pervade originalism. At the most fundamental level, originalism
misperceives the nature of history by presuming that it has an objective meaning that can be
discovered through study of ancient material. However, the belief in a hard core of historical
facts existing objectively is an illusion. The meaning of the Constitution does not reside in the
past, and any attempt to ascertain the original meaning of the Constitution necessarily entails
reconstructing the past in one’s mind. Originalism, therefore, cannot eliminate the necessity of
making value judgments to interpret the Constitution. Rather, it obscures the policy-making
function of constitutional interpretation by pretending that the meaning of constitutional
provisions can be recovered from historical annals.
There also is a serious question of whether past understanding of the Constitution can be
meaningfully transposed from one generation to another. Whatever the original meaning of the
Constitution may once have been, it was formed in the context of a past reality and in
accordance with past attitudes, both of which have changed considerably since the Constitution
was drafted. Blindly following the presumed original meaning of constitutional provisions
formulated in reaction to past conditions and attitudes that have long since changed is
dysfunctional, an instance of cultural lag whereby the meaning of the Constitution is left
dormant while the world around it changes.
Heller displays all of the flaws of originalism. It succumbs to the illusion that the
original meaning of the Second Amendment has an objective existence that can be recovered by
studying the past. In falling prey to this illusion, Heller perpetrates a pretense of objectivity that
functions as a facade for policy-making. Moreover, Heller refuses to consider that the world
around us has changed and that whatever meaning the Constitution may have had when it was
first adopted cannot simply be transposed to the present. Heller reveals the fundamental failure
of originalism; based on an illusion and dismissive of reality, originalism cannot sustain a viable
constitutional jurisprudence.
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I. ORIGINALISM
Originalism—the idea that the Constitution should be interpreted according to its original
meaning—has engendered intense debate in modern times. There are those who believe that
originalism is the only true method by which to interpret the Constitution; and those who believe
that it a spurious philosophy that distorts constitutional interpretation. In 2008, the Supreme
Court decided District of Columbia v. Heller,1 marking the first time that a majority of the Court
agreed to an opinion decidedly originalist in its methodology.2 While Heller may be considered
the triumph of originalism,3 it may in time prove to be its downfall by revealing the failings of
originalist philosophy.
Originalism is based on the notion that the Constitution has a fixed meaning that does not
change with the passage of time.4 The proper role of the Supreme Court, therefore, is to interpret
the Constitution by ascertaining its original meaning, at the time it was first enacted.5 As this
view has it, the process of constitutional interpretation consists of a search or quest for the
original meaning of the document, which operates as binding authority upon the judiciary.
Consequently, the process of constitutional interpretation should function as an objective inquiry
that precludes the exercise of judicial discretion. The Supreme Court is supposed to find
meaning for the Constitution, not create it. According to this way of thinking, justices who
depart from the straight and narrow of originalism are engaged in an illegitimate pursuit, reading
their personal values into the Constitution, rather than adhering to its original understanding.
There are two basic versions of originalism. The first or earlier version stresses the intent
of the framers as an authoritative source by which to ascertain original meaning. In fact, this
version of originalism looks almost exclusively to the framers’ intent to determine constitutional
meaning.6 A second, somewhat later version, of originalism seeks to determine the original
public understanding of the document. On this account, the framers’ intent may be useful in
ascertaining the original understanding of the Constitution, but only as part of a much broader
array of sources. What matters is not so much the intention of those who drafted the document
as the understanding of the members of the public who adopted it.7 The meaning of the
Constitution, then, is determined by the public understanding of the document at the time of its
adoption.
There are various approaches to originalism. Under the extreme approach, the only
relevant factor in constitutional interpretation is the original meaning of the document at the time

1

District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). Heller is discussed more fully infra, at notes 90-136.
The vote in Heller was 5-4.
3
See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism As Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 Harv. L.R. 191, 191
(2008).
4
See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 852-54 (1989); A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 37-41 (1997).
5
Id.
6
For a brief time, some early originalists shifted to a focus on the intent of the ratifiers of the document before
dropping the focus on original intent, whether of the framers or the ratifiers, in favor of a focus on original public
meaning. Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 Texas L.R. 1, 6 (2006). The early
version of originalism focusing on original intent “largely passed from the scene by the early 1990’s.” E.
Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 Geo. J. L. & Pub. Policy, 599, 603 (2004).
7
Antonin Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38 (1997); Keith
E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 Geo. J. L. & Pub. Policy, 599, 609-11 (2004).
2
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it was enacted.8 According to this approach, the meaning of the Constitution is constant and
does not change over time. Moreover, the Supreme Court is strictly bound to follow the original
meaning of the Constitution, and may not take into account other considerations.9 Justice Scalia
is one of the more—if not the most—prominent advocates of extreme originalism. He believes
that the Supreme Court should interpret the Constitution strictly according to its original
understanding and not ascribe evolving meaning to it.10 As he sees it, changes in the world
around us are of no relevance to the meaning of the document. Although Justice Scalia once
claimed that in a crunch he may prove to be a “faint-hearted originalist,” at the same time he
expressed strong opposition to the idea that the Constitution may have evolutionary content and
he dismissed the notion that interpretation of the document may change from age to age as
nothing more than a “canard.”11 Over the years, Justice Scalia has proven to be anything but
faint-hearted in his commitment to originalism. To the contrary, he has continued to insist that
the Constitution be interpreted strictly according to its original understanding. This was evident
most recently in District of Columbia v. Heller, where Justice Scalia maintained that although an
originalist view of the Second Amendment may be outmoded in present-day society, the Court
was bound to follow the original understanding of that Amendment. 12
In contrast to the extreme view of originalism, a more moderate approach looks to
original meaning as a starting point, but allows that the meaning of constitutional provisions may
be transformed as circumstances change over time.13 Lawrence Lessig, for one, posits that
because meaning is a function of both text and context, the original meaning of a constitutional
provision may be “translated” to accommodate contemporary circumstances.14 So, for example,
the extension of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to state criminal proceedings in 1961
is viewed by Professor Lessig as a translation of the Fourth Amendment justified by a
“transformed social and legal context.”15
More recently, Jack Balkin has advocated an even more fluid version of originalism that
transmutes it into a kind of living constitutionalism that allows each generation to make sense of
the Constitution’s words and principles in its own time.16 Professor Balkin maintains that proper
constitutional interpretation requires fidelity to the words of the text as understood in their
original meaning and to the principles that underlie the text, but does not require fidelity to the
“original expected application” of the text.17 According to this view, constitutional interpretation
is a never-ending process that produces change in constitutional doctrines, practices, and law.18
Using this approach, Professor Balkin concludes that the constitutional right to abortion is
8

See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085, 1086-1087
(1989).
9
Id.
10
See Antonin Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38 (1997);
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 861-65 (1989).
11
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 853, 864.
12
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2822 (2008). Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller is discussed infra at
notes 90-136. See also, Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003), arguing
that constitutional rights must be deeply rooted in the nation’s history and that “constitutional entitlements do not
spring into existence” with changed circumstances.
13
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165 (1993).
14
Id at 1172, 1264-64.
15
Id. at 1242.
16
Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Constitutional Commentary 291 (2007).
17
Id. at 295-96.
18
Id. at 295-303.
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consistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.19 This is a very moderate
species of originalism and, in fact, is the sort of jurisprudence that can be happily embraced by
those who believe in a living Constitution, the meaning of which evolves over time so as to adapt
to modern conditions.20 Nonetheless, there are those who maintain that even the moderate view
of originalism is unduly restrictive of constitutional interpretation because it binds the present
meaning of the Constitution to past concepts, while not allowing for the recognition of new
conceptions.21
While few, if any, originalists are as flexible as Professor Balkin, some originalists
recognize that the correct application of constitutional meaning can change over time.22 Even so,
their emphasis is on the original understanding of the document, which strictly prescribes any
evolution of its meaning. Staunch originalists, however, take it as an article of faith that the
Constitution has a fixed meaning that does not change with the passage of time. To a true
believer, the original meaning of the Constitution functions as an historical constant that may
only be changed by amending the Constitution itself.
It is important to note that originalism cannot explain the large body of constitutional
doctrine that has developed over the years since the Constitution was adopted.23 Although in
earlier times there may have been a generally held belief that the Constitution had a fixed
meaning dictated by the intent of its framers,24 this belief was little more than a myth that
obscured the true nature of constitutional adjudication. Notwithstanding random statements of
originalist import in various cases over the years,25 the vast majority of Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the Constitution have been non-originalist in their methodology. 26 In the words of
Thomas Grey, it is “a matter of unarguable historical fact” that over time the Court has
developed a large body of constitutional doctrine that does not derive from the original
understanding of the document.27 From its very inception, constitutional law has been a dynamic
process of creativity.28 Through the continual interpretation and reinterpretation of the text, the
Supreme Court perpetually creates new meaning for the Constitution. Despite originalist myths
to the contrary, in reality the meaning of the Constitution has been anything but constant.
As the 20th Century began, the Court increasingly abandoned originalist pretenses in
favor of a more realistic jurisprudence.29 By 1934, the Court had become openly dismissive of
19

Id. at 310-51.
See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonorigialists, 45 Loyola L.R. 611, 620-30 (1999).
21
See, Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 381, 411-12.
22
See, Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus A Thought or Two About Abortion), 24
Constitutional Commentary 383, 383-391 (2007).
23
See Jeffrey M. Shaman, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION—ILLUSION AND REALITY 3-10 (2001).
24
See Howard Gillman, Political Development and the Origins of the “Living Constitution,” ADVANCE (The
Journal of the American Constitution Society), vol. 1, no. 2, Fall 2007, at 18-19.
25
E.g., “The whole aim of construction, as applied to a provision of the Constitution, is to discover the meaning, to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of its framers and the people who adopted it.” Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n. v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 453 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
26
See Jeffrey M. Shaman, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION—ILLUSION AND REALITY 3-10 (2001).
Even Justice Scalia, a steadfast advocate of originalism, admits that many of the Court’s decisions have been based
on non-originalist theories of constitutional interpretation. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 849, 852(1989).
27
Thomas Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30
Stan. L. Rev. 843, 844 (1978).
28
See Jeffrey M. Shaman, note 25, at 3-10.
29
See Howard Gillman, Political Development and the Origins of the “Living Constitution,” ADVANCE (The
Journal of the American Constitution Society), vol. 1, no. 2, Fall 2007, at 21-23.
20
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originalist theory, observing in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell that the assertion
that “the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the
framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them…carries its
own refutation.”30 Similarly, twenty years later, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court
rebuffed originalist claims regarding the Fourteenth Amendment, explaining that “we cannot turn
the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted….”31 By this time, the Court had
become decidedly non-originalist in word as well as deed, openly embracing the jurisprudence of
a living Constitution.32
The Court’s modern jurisprudence was not well-received in all corners. In the 1970’s,
some commentators began to question what they saw as the more open-ended methodology of
constitutional interpretation practiced by the Warren Court and later the Burger Court.33 Critics
of the Court charged that its decisions expanding individual rights and liberties amounted to
illegitimate policy-making that had no basis in the Constitution.34 As these critics viewed
matters, the justices on the Court were reading their own personal values into the Constitution,
rather than interpreting the document, as it properly should be, by turning to the intent of the
framers.
A number of scholars, though, were quick to rise to the defense of non-originalist
constitutional interpretation.35 Moreover, they subjected the early version of originalism, which
looked to the framers’ intent to ascertain original meaning, to devastating criticism, exposing a
number of serious flaws in the originalist position.36 As these debates over constitutional
jurisprudence unfolded, the composition of the Supreme Court was changing, and in time a new
majority of justices on the Court saw fit to put a halt on the expansion of individual rights.
Under the leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court was increasingly predisposed to
curtail the recognition of new rights or liberties and even to rescind some that were previously
granted.37 No longer politically necessary and seriously wounded by piercing criticism, the early
version of originalism “largely passed from the scene by the early 1990’s.”38

30

Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934).
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
32
See also Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966):
In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic
notions of equality, any more than we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a
given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights. Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change. (Emphasis in the original.)
33
See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 10 (1971); William
Rehnquist, The Notion of A Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 695 (1976); Raoul Berger, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY (1977); Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of A Limited
Constitution, 27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 455 (1986).
34
See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 Geo. J. L. & Pub. Policy, 599, 599-602 (2004).
35
E.g., Ronald Dworkin, TAKINGS RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); Michael Perry, THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); Erwin Chemerinsky, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (1987).
36
E.g., John H. Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 Ind. L. J. 399 (1978); Thomas
Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 Stan. L.
Rev. 844 (1978); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204 (1980);
John E. Nowak, Realism, Nihilism, and the Supreme Court: Do the Emperors Have Nothing But Robes?, 22
Washburn L. J. 246 (1983).
37
Jeffrey M. Shaman, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW xvi (2008).
38
Keith E. Whittington, supra note 7, at 603.
31
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In passing from the scene, however, the early version of originalism was replaced by a
new form of originalism, one that de-emphasized the intent of the framers in favor of the original
public understanding of the Constitution as the source of its meaning.39 As noted above, Justice
Scalia is perhaps the most prominent advocate of the new originalism, but its cause has been
taken up by several scholars as well.40 Beyond that, originalism has gained a widespread
acceptance in the sense that almost no one believes that the original understanding is completely
irrelevant to contemporary constitutional interpretation.41 That, however, is a far cry from the
extreme version of the new originalism espoused by Justice Scalia and others asserting that the
Constitution has a constant meaning determined by its original understanding.
With the appointment of Justice Scalia and later Justice Thomas to the Supreme Court,
originalism has re-appeared in that lofty venue. Both justices have proven to be pertinacious
advocates of an extreme variety of originalism that posits a fixed meaning for the Constitution as
it was first understood. The originalism espoused by Justices Scalia and Thomas is a
departure—and a radical one, at that—from the Supreme Court’s well-established jurisprudence
of a living constitution. The radical nature of the sort of originalism promoted by these two
jurists is most dramatically evident in those opinions of Justice Thomas suggesting that a large
area of law concerning the commerce clause be overruled because it is based on non-originalist
thinking.42 To overrule, as Justice Thomas would have it, an extensive body of law that has
developed over many years would be a decidedly unsettling undertaking that could have severe
consequences for the legal system.43 And to do so in pursuit of an originalist agenda would be
an inordinate deviation from the constitutional jurisprudence that has guided the Court since the
beginning of the 20th Century.
Despite the efforts of Justices Scalia and Thomas, originalism has not been a significant
theme on either the Rehnquist Court or the Roberts Court.44 The advocacy of originalism by
both Scalia and Thomas has come almost exclusively in dissenting or concurring opinions that
garnered little support from other justices.45 Indeed, it was not until the Court’s decision in
District of Columbia v. Heller46 in 2008 that Justice Scalia was finally able to garner a majority
of the Court—and only a 5-4 majority, at that—to sign onto an opinion emphatically taking an

39

Id. at 608-12.
E.g., Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes…and Constitutions, 85 Geo. L.J. 1823 (1997) Randy Barnett, An
Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 611 (1999), John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A
Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 100 Nw. L. Rev. 383 (2006).
41
Daniel A. Farber, supra note 8, at 1086.
42
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-85, 601-602 (Thomas, J., concurring) (1995); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (Thomas, J., concurring) (2000). In another area, Justice Thomas also has stated that
he would be inclined to overrule a group of cases upholding a right of equal access to the criminal justice system
because they are inconsistent with the framers’ intent. M.L.B.v. S.L.J. 519 U.S. 102, 138-39 (Thomas, J.
dissenting).
43
“(T)he Court as an institution and the legal system as a whole have an immense stake in the stability of our
Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 574 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
44
Cass Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller As Griswold, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 246, 249 (2008).
45
See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (Thomas, J., concurring) (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(2000); M.L.B.v. S.L.J. 519 U.S. 102 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
46
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
40
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originalist slant.47 Heller may represent the apogee of originalism and, because it exposes the
fundamental flaws of originalism, may mark the beginning of its decline.48
Before discussing the more basic failings of originalism, it is interesting to note that in a
certain sense the theory of originalism is self-defeating, because in all probability the
Constitution was not originally understood to have a constant meaning fixed at the time of its
inception.49 According to H. Jefferson Powell, historical research shows that the framers did not
expect their intentions to govern future interpretation of the Constitution.50 Ironically, then,
originalism seems to be contrary to the original understanding of the Constitution.
There are, however, less ironic but more serious flaws to originalism, especially in its
more extreme form. At the most fundamental level, originalism misperceives the nature of
history by presuming that it has an objective meaning that can be discovered if one is only
diligent enough to search through enough ancient material. Unfortunately, it is a mistake to
think that the original meaning of the Constitution is an existential “thing” waiting to be
unearthed from old records and documents.51 As any good historian knows, interpretation of the
past entails considerably more than rummaging around in old archives to find hidden materials.
The astute historian Edward Hallett Carr explains that “The belief in a hard core of historical
facts existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of the historian is a
preposterous fallacy.”52 Despite clichés to the contrary, historical events do not speak for
themselves.53 History easily can be misread if one is not careful to engage in thoughtful analysis
of historical sources. Historical evidence often cannot be taken at face value; rather, it must be
interpreted in light of its context, a complex, though necessary, exercise. Arthur Schlesinger Jr.,
winner of the Pulitzer Prize for history, observes that all historians are “prisoners of their own
experience….(who) bring to history the preconceptions of our personalities and of our age.”54
The historian, he explains, “is committed to a doomed enterprise—the quest for an unattainable
objectivity.”55
The historian, therefore, is “necessarily selective” and the “element of interpretation
enters into every fact of history.”56 Historical analysis entails creativity as well as discovery. “In
truth the actual past is gone; and the world of history is an intangible world, re-created
imaginatively, and present in our minds.”57 Even when done properly, historical analysis leaves
a good deal of room for the historian to make value judgments. The historian sees things from a
particular point of view, according to a particular value system. Historical meaning may be
conceived at various levels of abstraction, ranging from the specific to the general, which offer
differing, yet equally valid (or equally invalid), visions of the past.58 In essence, historical
47

Sunstein, supra note 44, at 249.
Heller is discussed more fully infra, at notes 90-136.
49
See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885 (1985); see also,
Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127 (1987).
50
Id.
51
See Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 469, 477 (1981).
52
Edward Hallett Carr, WHAT IS HISTORY 10 (1962).
53
Id. at 9.
54
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Folly’s Antidote, New York Times, Jan. 1, 2007, p. A23
55
Id.
56
Edward Hallett Carr, supra note 52, at 10-11.
57
Carl L. Becker, What Are Historical Facts?, 8 W. Pol. Q. 327, 333 (1955) (emphasis added).
58
Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights , 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1057,
1067-87 (1990). Justice Scalia has asserted that in ascertaining original meaning of the Constitution, the Court
should refer to “the most specific level” at which a right can be identified. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
48
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analysis is a selective enterprise through which one imagines the past and thereby shapes it
according to his or her personal vision of reality.
True historians understand that the meaning of the Constitution does not reside in the
past, and that any attempt to ascertain the original meaning of the Constitution necessarily entails
reconstructing the past in one’s mind.59 Originalism, therefore, cannot eliminate the necessity of
making value judgments to interpret the Constitution. Rather, it obscures the policy-making
function of constitutional interpretation by pretending that the meaning of constitutional
provisions can be recovered from historical annals. Thus, there is an insidious aspect to
originalism in that it sneaks a judge’s personal views into constitutional interpretation by
pretending they are nothing more than the original understanding of the document. Originalism
offers an illusion of objectivity by holding out the false hope that the meaning of the Constitution
exists somewhere in the past.
Originalism can be a risky enterprise for judges prone to self-deception. In searching the
historical record for original meaning, there is often a temptation to discover what one wants to
discover.60 A judge may think that he or she is finding the original understanding of a
constitutional text, when in truth it is the judge’s own beliefs that are being revealed. Earlier
originalists, purportedly searching for the intent of the framers of the Constitution, were prone to
this failing61 and later-day originalists have succumbed to the same temptation on a number of
occasions.62 It seems that some practitioners of originalism are inclined to abandon their
originalist principles when it when it suits their political purposes to do so.63 Indeed, in a
number of instances originalists can be seen ignoring the historical record when it conflicts with
their political agenda.64
More principled originalists may endeavor to hew more faithfully to the historical record.
Even so, they are engaged in an impossible quest: the attempt to find a pre-determined meaning
for the Constitution in the recesses of history. In truth, the meaning of the Constitution is not
fixed in the past, or anywhere else, for that matter. When judges purport to engage in originalist
interpretation they recreate the past according to their own visions, including, it should be said,
their own values. Originalist interpretation of the Constitution may provide a veneer of
objectivity, but it is little more than a pretext that obscures the true nature of constitutional
interpretation which necessarily involves the exercise of judicial creativity.
While the open-endedness of history should not be enough to scare the Supreme Court
away from historical analysis of the Constitution, the Court should understand that the meaning
of the Constitution is not fixed in history (or anywhere else, for that matter) and waiting to be
found. Indeed, as Erwin Chemerinsky points out:
128 n. 6 (1989) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) This overlooks that choosing any level of abstraction, whether
specific of general, is in itself a value judgment. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. at 138-40 (Brennan, J.
dissenting). Moreover, rights may be specific or general depending on the perspective from which they are viewed;
there is no way to determine the most specific level of abstraction. See Lawrence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, id.
59
Supra at notes 51-58.
60
See John Hart Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 60 (1980).
61
Id.
62
See William P. Marshall, Constitutional Interpretation: Reclaiming the High Road, ADVANCE: THE J. OF
THE AM. CONST.SOCIETY ISSUE GROUPS, Fall 2007, at 89.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 91-92. See also, Randy Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 Michigan L.R. 1479, 1497 (2008), pointing out that in
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), “Justice Scalia simply dismissed the Ninth Amendment as nonjusticiable
without any examination of the Amendment’s text or original meaning.”

The End of Originalism

10

It is misguided and undesirable to search for a theory of constitutional interpretation that
will yield determinate results, right and wrong answers, to most constitutional questions.
No such theory exists or ever will exist.65
Even if one could somehow overcome the difficulties of reconstructing the original
understanding of the Constitution, it still might not be sound to follow that path. There is, of
course, the question, posed long ago by Thomas Jefferson, of whether one generation has a right
to bind another.66 To Jefferson, the answer was self-evident; the earth, he said, “belongs…to the
living…(and) the dead have neither powers nor rights over it.”67 Perhaps, though, the more
telling concern is not so much one of authority--that is, not so much a question of whether the
dictates of a past generation should bind the present generation--as it is a concern about
transposition--that is, a question of whether past understanding of the Constitution can be
meaningfully transposed from one generation to another. Whatever the original meaning of the
Constitution may once have been, it was formed in the context of a past reality and in accordance
with past attitudes, both of which have changed considerably since the Constitution was drafted.
History is inherently evolutionary, and a true historical approach to interpreting the Constitution
would not come to an abrupt end with the adoption of the Constitution in 1787. Rather, it would
recognize the evolving nature of history as an ongoing source of meaning for the Constitution. It
is simplistic and ahistorical to believe that the Constitution can be interpreted simply by
reference to the original understanding of the document. To transfer that understanding,
fashioned under past conditions and attitudes, to contemporary situations may produce sorry
consequences that are contrary to the original understanding of the Constitution. Blindly
following the presumed meaning of constitutional provisions formulated in reaction to past
conditions and attitudes that have long since changed does not, in the end, achieve the original
understanding. Nor is it very likely to be an effective means of dealing with contemporary
problems. Adherence to the original understanding of the Constitution reduces the capacity of
the document to be used to respond to the needs of modern society. Originalism—or, at least,
the extreme version of originalism--is dysfunctional, an instance of cultural lag whereby the
meaning of the Constitution is left dormant while the world around it changes.
Justice Brennan once observed that “the great genius of the Constitution rests not in any
static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its
great principles to cope with current problems and needs.”68 Therefore, he maintained, whatever
the Constitution may have meant in the past should not be the measure of what it means today.69
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As Woodrow Wilson once put it, “The Constitution was not meant to hold the government back
to the time of horses and wagons.”70
Some scholars take this line of reasoning one step further by maintaining that the original
understanding is inextricably locked to the past and cannot be transplanted to the present. In
other words, because the original understanding was formed in reference to a reality and ways of
thinking that no longer exist, it cannot sensibly be applied to the present. The original meaning
of the Constitution is inextricably bound to the past and it is senseless to attempt to transpose it
to the present or future. What the people of 1787 may have intended for their times is not what
they may have intended for ours. Life constantly changes, and the reality and ideas that existed
in 1787 are long since gone.
Consider, for instance, the authority granted to Congress by Article I to “regulate
Commerce among the several States.” Originally this was meant to allow Congress to regulate
no more than interstate transactions, leaving it to each state to deal with internal transactions that
had no impact beyond its borders.71 In those days, however, it was much simpler to draw a line
between commerce that was interstate and commerce that was internal to a state. There was not
much of a national economy, and many transactions were purely intrastate. By the end of the
19th Century, the situation was radically different,72 and is even more so today with the advent of
globalization. Now there is an immense national and international economy that affects every
locality. There is a vast network of commerce, connecting its various elements to one another.
Even transactions that occur entirely within one state’s borders have repercussions in other
states, not to mention other nations. These prodigious changes in our economy render the
original understanding of the Commerce Clause all but irrelevant. The original understanding of
“Commerce among the several States” was formulated when economic conditions were
drastically different and makes little, if any, sense in reference to the contemporary era of a
global economy.
Despite the vast changes that have transformed the nation’s economy, Justice Thomas has
suggested that the Supreme Court should abandon much of the existing constitutional doctrine
concerning the Commerce Clause that has developed since the 1930’s and in its place return to
doctrine more consistent with the original understanding of the Commerce Clause.73 This
suggestion would render the Commerce Clause desultory, an 18th Century proviso adrift in a 21st
Century world.
Brown v. Board of Education,74 the landmark decision in 1954 ruling that racial
segregation in public schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment, offers another telling example
of why, as the world around us changes, original meaning of a constitutional provision cannot be
transplanted from one time to another. As the Supreme Court explained in Brown, at the time
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, public education was in a nascent stage.75 In the South,
there were relatively few public schools, and what schooling was available (for white students
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only) was conducted by private groups.76 In some southern states, education of AfricanAmericans was prohibited by law, and throughout the South, few African-American received any
education whatsoever.77 In the North, while public schools were more prevalent, they were a far
cry from what they would later become.78 The curriculum was rudimentary, ungraded schools
were common in rural areas, the school term was three months a year in many states, and
compulsory school attendance was virtually unknown.79
By 1954, of course, the situation was very different. As the Court pointed out in Brown,
by the mid-twentieth century education was perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments.80 That compulsory school attendance laws had been adopted throughout the
nation and vast sums of public money allocated to public schools demonstrated the nation’s
commitment to the importance of education in a democratic society.81 Education was recognized
as the foundation of good citizenship, essential to the performance of basic public
responsibilities.82 Moreover, education was vital to socialization, to convey cultural values, and
to prepare for later professional training.83 A high school diploma, not to mention a college
degree, was a requisite of entry to the job market, and more education led to higher-paying, more
fulfilling employment. In sum, it was doubtful that any child could be expected to succeed in
life if he or she was denied the opportunity of an education.84
Given these momentous changes concerning education, the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment simply did not speak to the constitutional issue presented to the Court in
Brown in 1954. As the Court itself said:
(W)e cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to
1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the
light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the
Nation.85
Brown vividly illustrates that history cannot always resolve the problems of today, and, in
fact, too literal a quest for past intentions may be counterproductive.86 Whatever meaning the
Constitution originally possessed is rooted in the past and cannot be readily transplanted to the
present. Extreme originalism ignores that times change and that the validity of past beliefs may
diminish. At its worst, originalism renders the Constitution “a stagnant, archaic, hidebound
document steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a time long past.”87 Even in less dire
renditions, originalism leaves the Constitution a passive thing, unresponsive to the reality in
which it exists.
That is not to say that the past should be ignored; certainly there are valuable lessons to
be learned from history. It is to say, however, that the original understanding of the Constitution
should not be accepted as an infallible source that dictates the present-day meaning of the
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document. We should attempt to comprehend past constitutional history, insofar as we can, but
should not allow it to rule us. As Chief Justice Warren said on the occasion of his retirement
from the Supreme Court, “We, of course, venerate the past, but our focus is on the problems of
the day and the future so far as we can see it.”88
The framers themselves seemed to be aware that they could not predict the future, and
therefore took the sensible course of formulating the Constitution in a way that would allow it to
be adapted to changing conditions as time passed.89 Unfortunately, the sensibility of that course
of action often is ignored by those who rigidly cling to the myopic myth of originalism.
II. ORIGINALISM IN EXTREMIS: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
In 2008, the Supreme Court decided District of Columbia v. Heller, marking the first time
that a majority of the Court—albeit a slim 5-4 majority, signed onto an opinion so decidedly
originalist in it approach.90 The opinion in Heller, written by Justice Scalia may be considered
the triumph of originalism, but in time may prove to be its downfall, revealing, as it does, the
deep fault lines that run through originalist theory.
In Heller, the Supreme Court ruled that the Second Amendment of the Constitution
protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use
that firearm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.
Accordingly, the Court went on to strike down a District of Columbia law that banned the
possession of hand guns.91 Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority in Heller adheres faithfully
to his rigid originalist philosophy. Much of the opinion is devoted to an historical exposition of
the Second Amendment, which was enacted in 1791, to show that it originally secured an
individual right to possess firearms unconnected with service in a militia and that it proscribed
laws that prohibit the possession of firearms commonly used for lawful purposes. The opinion
surveys 17th Century English history, 18th Century American dictionaries, Blackstone’s
Commentaries, the Journals of the Continental Congress, the Federalist and Anti-Federalist
papers, early American political essays and treatises, state constitutional enactments adopted
both before and shortly after the Second Amendment, and other sources from around the time of
the American Revolution.92 The opinion is thoroughly originalist; it looks exclusively to the
original understanding of the Second Amendment and allows for no evolution of the
Amendment’s meaning. Changed circumstances have absolutely no bearing on Justice Scalia’s
analysis of the Second Amendment, and practical considerations are dismissed out of hand. All
that matters to Justice Scalia is the original meaning of the Second Amendment at the time it was
adopted in 1791.
After surveying the historical materials, Justice Scalia concluded that while the purpose
of “codifying” the right to bear arms as a constitutional provision was to ensure the preservation
a well-regulated militia, this did not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason for
which Americans valued the right to bear arms; “most undoubtedly thought it even more
88
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important for self-defense and hunting.”93 As Justice Scalia read history, it was individual selfdefense that was the “central component” of the Second Amendment right to bear arms.94
Although admitting that the right to bear arms was not unlimited, Justice Scalia again turned to
history, at this point to determine the permissible limits that may be placed on the right to bear
arms.95 He explicitly rejected use of a test that would balance the competing interests in the case
and flatly refused to consider any empirical evidence that showed the need to regulate handgun
violence.96 The Second Amendment, Scalia proclaimed, “elevates above all other interests the
right of right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”97
That relevant circumstances concerning the Second Amendment may have changed over the
years was of no moment to Scalia. He acknowledged the problem of handgun violence in the
nation, but deemed it irrelevant because “the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily
takes certain policy choices off the table.”98 He allowed that an originalist view of the Second
Amendment may be outmoded in present-day society where a standing army is well-supplied
with arms, where well-trained police forces provide personal security, and where gun violence is
an extremely serious problem, but dismissed those considerations because “it is not the role of
(the Supreme) Court to pronounce the Second Amendment extinct.”99
It is interesting to compare Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller to the dissenting opinion
that was entered by Justice Stevens. Like Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens engaged in an extensive
examination of the historical record concerning the Second Amendment. He surveyed the
debates at the Constitutional Convention, proposals from a number of state ratifying conventions,
the English Bill of Rights, Blackstone’s Commentaries, post-enactment commentary, 19th
Century case law, and more. After assessing this material, Justice Stevens concluded, in
contradistinction to Justice Scalia, that the Second Amendment protects the individual right to
bear arms only in connection with military service and does not limit the authority of the
government to regulate the nonmilitary use or possession of firearms. As Justice Stevens saw it,
the preamble to the Second Amendment clearly states that the purpose of the Amendment is to
protect the right of the people of each of the several states to maintain a well-regulated militia.
Moreover, Stevens believes that the historical record emphatically confirms that “the Framers’
single-minded focus in crafting the constitutional guarantee ‘to keep and bear arms’ was on
military uses of firearms, which they viewed in the context of service in state militias.”
Justice Breyer entered a separate dissenting opinion asserting that whatever the original
meaning of the Second Amendment may have been, it should mark the beginning of the
constitutional inquiry, rather than its end.100 In Justice Breyer’s view, the constitutional issues
raised by the case could only be resolved by focusing upon practicalities—the purpose of the
District of Columbia law in question, the problems that called it into being, and its relationship to
its objectives.101 Applying a balancing test that took into account extensive empirical evidence
showing the magnitude of gun-related crime and violence, Justice Breyer concluded that the D.C.
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law, directed to the presence of handguns in high-crime urban areas, was a constitutionally
permissible legislative response to a serious, indeed life-threatening, problem.102
It should come as no surprise that both Justice Scalia and Stevens can undertake what
appears to be a scholarly exegesis of the original understanding of the Second Amendment, yet
come to opposite conclusions as to what the Amendment means. As we have seen, the meaning
of the Constitution does not reside in history, and when judges engage in originalist
interpretation they recreate the past according to their own visions, including, of course, their
own values. While both the Scalia and Stevens opinions in Heller are replete with historical
detail, neither exhibits “the subtlety, nuance, acknowledgement of counter arguments, and
(above all) immersion in Founding-era debates” that is essential to good historical research.103
To the contrary, both opinions traffic in “the worst kind of ‘law-office history,’ in which each
side engages in shamelessly (and shamefully) selective readings of the historical record in order
to support what one strongly suspects are pre-determined positions.”104 For all his professed love
of history, Justice Scalia seems to be unaware of the complexities of historical research, and both
he and Justice Stevens seem to be ignorant of the principle, second nature to professional
historians, that the historical record is complicated and, indeed, often contradictory.105 In their
zeal to persuade, “both Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens assert—laughably to a real historian—
that the Second Amendment had only one meaning at the framing, and that the meaning was for
all practical purposes universally shared.”106 Good historians know that matters are much more
complex than this, and that the Second Amendment did not have a single meaning universally
shared throughout the nation when it was enacted in 1791.107
Good historians also know that history is inherently evolutionary and the world around
us changes. Whatever may have been the original understanding of the Second Amendment, that
understanding was formulated over 200 years ago in a very different world where gun violence
was not nearly as prevalent as it is today and where police forces provided minimal protection
against crime and violence. As Judge Richard Posner recently pointed out, “There are few more
antiquated constitutional provisions than the Second Amendment.”108 Yet Justice Scalia is
willing to cling to what he believes to be the original meaning of this antiquated provision,
brushing aside the serious problem of gun-related crime in present-day society.
That relevant circumstances concerning the Second Amendment may have changed over
the years is of no moment to Scalia. He acknowledges the problem of handgun violence in the
nation, but deems it irrelevant because “the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily
takes certain policy choices off the table.”109 He allows that an originalist view of the Second
Amendment may be outmoded in present-day society where a standing army is well-supplied
with arms, where well-trained police forces provide personal security, and where gun violence is
an extremely serious problem, but dismisses those considerations because “it is not the role of
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(the) Court to pronounce the Second Amendment extinct.”110 All of this, of course, begs the
question by assuming that the Second Amendment must be interpreted according to its original
meaning. As Justice Stevens points out in his dissenting opinion, the constitutional right that the
Court announced in its opinion was not “enshrined” in the Second Amendment by the Framers;
rather, it was set forth by the Court itself in a groundbreaking decision investing the Second
Amendment with meaning that was not previously realized.111
Justice Scalia’s refusal in Heller to consider present-day concerns was particularly
troubling to Justice Breyer. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer pointed out that Justice
Scalia’s originalist approach ignores an important question: Given the purposes for which the
Framers enacted the Second Amendment how should it be applied to modern day circumstances
that they could not have anticipated?112
Assume, for argument’s sake, that the Framers did intend the Amendment to offer a
degree of self-defense protection. Does that mean that the Framers also intended to
guarantee a right to possess a loaded gun near swimming pools, parks, and playgrounds?
That they would not have cared about the children who might pick up a loaded gun on
their parents’ bedside table? That they… would have lacked concern for the risk of
accidental deaths or suicides that readily accessible loaded handguns in urban areas might
bring…?113
These questions cannot be answered, Justice Breyer pointedly noted, simply by “combining
inconclusive historical research with judicial ipse dixit.”114 Indeed, whatever may be revealed by
historical research concerning the Second Amendment cannot answer the questions of today
about how the Amendment should be interpreted and applied in light of current reality.
After concluding that the Second Amendment does protect an individual right to possess
firearms unconnected with service in a militia, Justice Scalia allowed that the right secured by
the Second Amendment, like most rights, was not unlimited.115 From Blackstone through 19thcentury cases, he noted, both courts and commentators explained that the right was “not a right to
keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”116
To determine what limits may be placed on the right to bear arms, Justice Scalia again turned to
history, noting with approval that the Court had previously ruled in United States v. Miller that
the Second Amendment protected possession of the sort of weapons that were “in common use at
the time.”117 That limitation, Justice Scalia declared, “is fairly supported by the historical
tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’”118 Thus, the Scalia
opinion recognizes a qualification to the right to right to keep and carry arms, which limits the
right to the possession of commonly used weapons that are not especially dangerous or unusual.
Justice Scalia’s reasoning in this instance is reminiscent of the reasoning in Lochner v.
New York, which took a similar formalistic approach based on what the Court believed to be
common knowledge in order to limit the authority of a state to regulate working conditions. 119 In
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Lochner, the Court struck down a New York law setting maximum hours of work for bakers on
the ground that it violated the constitutional right to liberty of contract protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In rejecting the state’s assertion that the law was
a permissible health measure designed to protect the wellbeing of bakers, the Court declared that
it was commonly understood that the trade of a baker has never been understood as an unhealthy
one.120 In both Lochner and Heller, the Court erects categories to delineate the scope of a
constitutional right and the authority of the state to enact laws that limit the right. In Lochner the
category was based on “common understanding,” while in Heller it is based on common usage.
In either case, the Court sets forth formal categories that function to define the meaning of the
Constitution.
The problem in Lochner was that in relying on its view of common knowledge, the Court
ignored the reality of the situation. Whatever might have been the common understanding of the
nature of the baking trade, empirical evidence had been presented to the Court (and cited in
Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion) showing that the occupation of baking did in fact pose
significant health risks. In other words, the Court in Lochner ignored that there was compelling
reason to support the New York maximum hour law.
Along the same lines, the problem in Heller is that the Court, in relying on common
practice at the time the Second Amendment was adopted, ignores the reality of the present
situation. Whatever may have been the common practice concerning firearms in the 18 th
Century, empirical evidence demonstrates a present-day need for gun-control measures, such as
the one adopted by the District of Columbia. In other words, the Court in Heller ignores that
there is a compelling state interest to support the D.C. law banning handguns.
In fact, Justice Scalia’s opinion acknowledges the serious problem of handgun violence
in the nation, but asserts that the Second Amendment “necessarily takes certain policy choices
off the table,” thus precluding laws that prohibit possession of handguns that may be used for
self-defense in the home.121 As Justice Scalia sees it, the Second Amendment precludes
balancing because it “elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”122 Hence, the opinion flatly refuses to take
a balancing approach to determine the permissible limitations that may be placed on the right to
bear arms.123 Justice Scalia explicitly rejects the possibility of balancing and is sharply critical of
its use.
Regarding balancing, Justice Scalia states that he “know(s) no other enumerated
constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interestbalancing’ approach.” He insists that “constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they
were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or
(yes) even future judges think that scope too broad.” Hence, the Court “would not apply an
‘interest-balancing’ approach to the prohibition of a peaceful neo-Nazi march through Skokie.”
This simply is incorrect. Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has continuously
shaped and re-shaped the scope of constitutional rights, including enumerated constitutional
rights, and for many years has done so primarily through a process of balancing interests.124
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s assertion to the contrary, the free speech provision of the First
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Amendment stands as a prominent example of the Court’s use of balancing to define the scope of
an enumerated constitutional right. Balancing became an important part of First Amendment
jurisprudence at a relatively early date. Justice Holmes’ clear and present danger test, first
enunciated during World War I, is a form of balancing that weighs the need to restrict speech. 125
Later, the Court adopted a refined version of the clear and present danger test as part of the
balancing calculus to determine when it is constitutionally permissible to regulate speech that
may incite unlawful conduct.126 In 1939, in striking down an ordinance that prohibited the
distribution of leaflets on the ground that it violated the First Amendment, the Court explained
that “the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weight the circumstances and to
appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of regulation.”127 As a general
matter, content-based regulations of speech are subject to a strict scrutiny balancing test that asks
whether they are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. Content-neutral
regulations of speech are subject to an intermediate scrutiny balancing test that asks whether they
are appropriately related to an important governmental interest. Although some First
Amendment rules do not involve balancing, many of them do, and balancing plays a significant
role in a great many First Amendment cases.
His opinion in Heller does not represent Justice Scalia’s first attack on the balancing
process. In a concurring opinion in Bendix Autolite Corporation v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc.,
decided in 1988, he argued that balancing should not be used to decide dormant commerce
clause cases because “the scale analogy is not really appropriate, “since the interests on both
sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a
particular rock is heavy.”
This is clever, but disingenuous. It misconceives the nature the nature of balancing by
casting it as a quantitative measure rather than a qualitative one. The balance or scale certainly
in an appropriate analogy—or more precisely, an appropriate metaphor—that refers to the
comparative assessment of individual and governmental interests. Justice Scalia should be well
aware that the term “balancing” is not to be taken literally in the sense that interests are
quantitatively weighed or measured against one and other. Rather, balancing entails a qualitative
weighing of interests to “appraise the substantiality of interests” relevant to the constitutional of
a law.128 Balancing is a process that the Supreme Court has used for many years in many cases,
including cases involving enumerated constitutional rights.
Justice Scalia’s more serious objection to balancing is that it involves the making of value
judgments, a task that Justice Scalia believes is beyond the competence of the Courts and that
should be left to the legislature. This criticism, though, seriously misperceives the true nature of
the constitutional process. The truth is that constitutional interpretation, whether done through
the process of balancing, the mode of originalism, or any other methodology, necessarily
involves making value choices.129 Despite persistent myth to the contrary, the fact is that
constitutional interpretation is impossible without some choosing among values or policies.
Judging, after all, is precisely that: making judgments or choosing among values.130
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As explained previously, originalism does not obviate the necessity of making value
judgments to interpret the Constitution.131 Instead, it masks the policy-making function of
constitutional interpretation by pretending that the meaning of the Constitution is dictated by its
original understanding. While originalism may present itself as value-neutral, in truth it is
nothing of the sort; with originalism, value judgments are made covertly through the illusion of
original meaning.
In contrast, balancing affords transparency and rationality to constitutional adjudication.
Balancing is a realistic means of constitutional interpretation that acknowledges that
constitutional decision-making necessarily entails the making of value judgments. Balancing
brings those value judgments out into the open and directs that they be made in a considered,
thoughtful way. The great value of balancing is that it brings purposefulness to the process of
constitutional interpretation. Balancing is teleological; it calls for informed decision-making
done in a purposive manner. While originalism obscures the policy questions generated by
constitutional adjudication, balancing attempts to answer them through the exercise of reasoned
judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller is the sort of discourse that gives originalism an
especially bad name. It takes a decidedly loop-sided view of the historical record to advance a
constitutional right that had never been recognized before. Given the serious flaws of his
opinion, it was inevitable that Justice Scalia would be accused of abandoning principled analysis
in favor of pursuing a political agenda. Indeed, critics on both sides of the ideological spectrum
have accused Justice Scalia of exactly that. Critics on the left, pointing to Scalia’s skewed
historical lucubration, were quick to assert that the opinion was driven by a partisan agenda
opposed to gun control.132 Perhaps more telling, however, was that similar criticism came from a
decidedly more conservative source, J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Circuit Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In an article published in the Virginia Law Review,
Judge Wilkinson likened the Heller decision to Roe v. Wade.133 He asserted that both decisions
show an absence of respect for constitutional textualism and the tenets of federalism, both
represent a rejection of neutral principles, and both fail to show sufficient respect for legislative
judgments.134 As for the originalist analysis practiced by Justice Scalia in Heller, Judge
Wilkinson said this: “While Heller can be hailed as a triumph of originalism, it can just as easily
be seen as the opposite—an exposé of original intent as a theory no less subject to judicial
subjectivity and endless argumentation as any other.”135 In Judge Wilkinson’s view, the Scalia
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opinion in Heller amounts to an “aggressive brand of originalism” that “discards the tenets of
(judicial) restraint.”136
Heller is indeed an aggressive brand of originalism, and one that exhibits the worst faults
of that methodology. At its foundation, Heller succumbs to the illusion that the original meaning
of the Second Amendment has an independent and objective existence that can somehow be
magically recovered through diligent study of the past. In falling prey to this illusion, Heller
perpetrates a pretense of objectivity that functions as a facade for policy-making. Moreover,
Heller ignores that whatever meaning the Second Amendment may have had when it was
adopted in 1791 cannot simply be transposed to the present. The refusal in Heller to consider
that the world around us has changed—and considerably so--renders the Second Amendment a
senseless constitutional provision—an antiquated law adrift in a contemporary world. Heller
reveals the fundamental failure of originalism; based on an illusion and dismissive of reality,
originalism cannot sustain a viable constitutional jurisprudence.
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